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The displacement of the international balance of forces in favour of Germany at 
the end of the '30's basically changed the historical possibilities of Central European 
nationalities. The Versailles-system, which caused and restricted these nationalist efforts 
at the same time, collapsed. Reversionist movements rooted in Trianon lost their global 
character disturbing European order owing to the weakening of the Western democracies 
and the superiority of Germany and they seemed to be solvable within the frames of a 
regional conflict restricted by Germany. The new power-relations had a similar effect on 
the Croatian efforts for autonomy that had been thrashing windward politically for 
centuries. The German and Italian interests behind the „punishment" of the refractory 
Yugoslavia opened the way for the right-wing radical nationalist forces that had been exiled 
until that time and had been forced into a marginal position from political point of view 
even within the Croatian national movement, that is, the ustashas between the two World-
Wars. They were driven to the stage of history not by the social, political or cultural forces 
of the movement but by the wind of foreign affairs and the tempest of the war. 
The first modern Hungarian—Croatian interstate relations were created by and, at 
the same time, confined within limits by this European background shortly described above 
both in chronological and qualitative senses. 
The diplomacy of the two states were interested, almost exclusively, in two 
questions from the very beginning: the question of the status of Muraköz and — through 
its prism — the problem of minorities living in this territory. As is well known, the 
Italian—German agreement recording the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, concluded on 24 
April 1941 stated that Croatia bordered on Hungary along the Drava and besides Bácska 
and Banat, which were finally placed under German military administration, Muraköz and 
the region beyond the Mura belonged to Hungary, too. However, the two countries were 
obliged to make bilateral contracts concerning these two latter regions.' 
The Hungarian army marching into Muraköz was ordered by Henrik Werth, chief 
of staff — owing to the disorder — to treat Croatian inhabitants, unlike Serbians living in 
Bácska, „in a friendly manner"; they could not organize ceremonies of marching in, either, 
1 Zbornik dokumcnata i podataka o narodnooslobodila"dcom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. (Hereinafter: ZDNOR) 
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Foreign Affairs of Hungary) 1936—1945 (Hereinafter: DIMK) volume V. Compiled by. GYULA JUHÁSZ. Edited 
by GYULA JUHÁSZ and JUDIT FEJES. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1982. doc. No. 752, p. 1068., doc. No. 773., 
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and the introduction of Hungarian military administration was postponed to a later time than 
in Bácska.2 
At the cabinet-meeting of 21 April 1941, Prime Minister Bárdossy, referring to 
the fact that „there had been numerous incidents" during the occupation of Muraköz and 
that further worsening of the situation could be expected, suggested initiating negotiations 
as soon as possible and the Parliament agreed to this. They accepted the point of view 
according to which Hungary would maintain its conceptual sovereignity in Muraköz, 
however, they were ready to pass administration to Croatia on set conditions, but by any 
means temporarily. The railway „Murakeresztúr — Csáktornya — German border" would 
belong to Hungary and Hungarian companies could extract oil in Muraköz. Extensive right 
of peage should be provided for the railway traffic between Gyékényes—Susak—Fiume, 
including the right of access for Hungarian trains and the establishment of fuel-depots. They 
demanded a free zone and the establishment of Hungarian storehouses in the port of Susak. 
Besides, the negotiations would have to decide how Croatian authorities would ensure the 
protection of property and compensate agáinst possible damages. According to the 
government's point of view conceptual agreement should be achieved in the matter of the 
navigability of the river Drava and its opening for Hungarian ships. Finally, the Hungarian 
border should be along the middle line of the channel of the Drava and the Danube. They 
related this formula to the idea of the mutual exchange of population.3 
The Croatian point of view was first detailed by Poglavnik Ante Pavelic, leader 
of the Independent Croatian State, to László Bartók, Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Zagreb. 
In the beginning Pavelic considered the position of the Hungarian government to be 
acceptable and expressed his hope that the region would be passed to Croatia as soon as 
possible and he would have been ready to renounce Gola and Dalya belonging to Croatia 
in exchange, but he definitely opposed the idea of the exchange of population, and not 
without reason. As a matter of fact, if he had accepted it, Croatia would have weakened 
one of its winning cards, the Croatian ethnic composition of the region. The Croatian 
government argued on the basis of the ethnic principle and historical right. The former was 
based on the dominantly Croatian character of the population of Muraköz, while historical 
arguments were based on the fact that Muraköz had been a part of Hungary until 1918 but 
it had been under the control of Croatia between 1848 and 1861.4 
The Croatian attitude, however, had lost most of its flexibility by the time of the 
negotiations that began in Zagreb on 28 May: they were not willing to give any 
compensation for the administration of the region any more.5 In my opinion, this can be 
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explained also by the fact that Muraköz was upgraded in the eyes of the Croatian 
government because of the defeat in the Italian—Croatian border-negotiations. On the other 
hand, they judged that Hungary — unlike Italy — was not in the position that its claims 
should be granted without reservation. 
Both partners got support from Germany after the failure of the negotiations. 
However, the actual leaders of Croatia, Siegfrid Kasche, German ambassador in Zagreb, 
and Glirse von Horstenau, the German general, unambiguously declared that they did not 
intend to play the part of a judge, which meant — in this case — that the status of Muraköz 
could not be subjected to debates and the agreement on the problem of the administration 
depended on the two parties. For purposes of emphasis the general reminded Pavelié that 
the Führer would approve of a solution of this kind, too: the attention of Hungary was 
mainly directed to the fact that serious German interests were tied up with the consolidation 
of Croatia, that is why they had to make concessions in the question of the Croatian 
compromise claimed (railway traffic towards the Adriatics, a free zone in the port of Su§ak, 
the question of the navigation on the Drava, the exchange of population).6 
The negotiations took a new turn in June. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lorkovic 
brought up the idea of the common possession of the region. However, László Marosy, the 
ambassador's deputy objected to condominium on behalf of his government and he 
suggested the expression: „the state border is the Drava, the administrational border is the 
Mura" instead. Marosy tried to make the Croatian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mladen 
Lorkovic accept the Hungarian point of view by expressing uncomprisingly: if a decision 
is not made shortly, his government cannot choose but to eliminate the „intolerable 
temporary situation". Pavelic, in opposition to Lorkovié, did not even want to hear about 
the condominium of the region and declared in a theatrical tone of voice not surprising 
from him at all: „he can always stand with head erect in front of the Croatian people if 
he can refer to the Hungarian military occupation as the manifestation of violence rather 
than entering into a bargain with Hungary on this question".7 
The intention to negotiate of the Hungarian government — if there was any in a 
serious form at all — disappeared completely by the end of June. Marosy's attention was 
called to the fact that — from that point on — he was authorized only to inform the 
Croatian government that „the intention of maintaining Muraköz is getting more and more 
definite in Hungarian public opinion" and he was not allowed to enter into any negotia-
tions.8 On 28 June the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Döme Sztójay, 
ambassador in Berlin about the Hungarian—Croatian negotiations, the reasons of the failure 
and the planned introduction of military administration. They asked him to pay special 
attention to the following: this information „cannot be like a request for the agreement of 
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the Imperial government or cannot have the form as if we wanted to leave the question of 
Muraköz in the hands of the axis powers in our measurements".9 This also meant that the 
matter of the exchange of population was removed from the agenda for a while, too. 
Sztójay met Ernst Woermann, German deputy undersecretary of Foreign Affairs once again 
at the beginning of September and — in order to avoid occasional misunderstandings, 
repeated the point of view of his government: they regarded the negotiations with Croatia 
on Muraköz as definitely finished and they did not see any chance in the future of changing 
the situation in question within the framework of a possible agreement. Woermann took 
notice of Sztójay's statement and repeated the „reserved" attitude of the German 
government.10 This meant that Germany had practically understood the unilateral 
annexation of Muraköz to Hungary. Croatia was defeated in the question of the border by 
its Hungarian neighbour, too. In spite of this, Croatian governments hoped all the time that 
there would be some opportunity for rearranging the border, if not at some other time, after 
the victorious end of the war. Until this time arrives — as Lorkovic detailed to Bartók 
several times — „the most important desire of the Croatian government is not to touch the 
ethnic composition of the regions mentioned above".'1 
Hungarian—Croatian relations became definitely worse after the failure of the 
negotiations. Mutual frontier outrages were frequent and negative change occurred in the 
ethnic policy of the Hungarian government concerning Croatians. The census and expulsion 
of the so — called „settlers" and immigrants, that is, persons who had settled down after 
1 December 1918, started here, too. Not only expulsions but also the activisation of 
nationalist organizations operating with official support in the territories of the two 
countries were sources of debate. The press of neither of the two countries spared each 
other. Croatian newspapers attacked the annexation of the region to Hungary fiercely, while 
the Hungarian press was proving violently that „Muraköz" Was not inhabited by Croatians 
but by Sokac and Bunyevác (Catholic Serbian) people who spoke the so-called „Muraközi" 
language.12 
After the one-sided solution of the debated question of territory it was not in the 
interest of the Hungarian government to further strain relations between the two countries, 
so much the more as they were worried about the approach of the two little states 
established with the help of Germany, that is, of Slovakia and Croatia to Rumania; they 
regarded this fact as giving rise to the possibility of the establishment of a new Little 
Entente. Croatia had to accept the facts, although it did not renounce Muraköz. It did not 
get any support not only in the annexation of Muraköz but the Croatian effort to deepen the 
situation was also suppressed in Berlin. 
9 DIMK vol. V. doc. No. 890. p. 1244. 
10 WIL doc. No. 422. pp. 618—619. 
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The new Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Miklós Kállay ordered 
the ambassador Marosy right after taking up his post to make efforts to advance in the 
ethnic question on mutual terms and to make initiating steps in this direction. The note sent 
to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the ambassador on 12 March 1942 listed the 
offences committed against Hungarian people in Croatia, the wrangling of the permission 
of the Hungarian Cultural Community in Croatia, the activities of nazis in Osijek, and the 
question of schools, and definitely called the attention of the Croatian government to the 
danger that „the way of treating Hungarian people in Croatia would have consequences on 
the position of Croatians in Hungary". Marosy had a longer conversation with Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs Lorkovic when he passed him the note. The latter defended himself by 
saying that, although he had not actually permitted the operation of the Hungarian 
association, its members could organize themselves without restriction. When Marosy's 
partner blamed him for the fact that no Hungarian school operated in Croatia while teaching 
was in progress in 13 so-called Croatian—Hungarian, 5 Wendish-Hungarian, 7 Bunyevác-
Hungarian and 15 Sokac-Hungarian mixed schools in Hungary, the secretary of Foreign 
Affairs defended himself by saying that it was not his fault but that of the previous 
Yugoslavian governments, and that the intention of the Croatian government to change this 
situation is „unconditional and serious". At the same time he expressed his disagreement 
with the division of the Croatians in Hungary into Sokac and Bunyevac people because, as 
he said: „national name serves as a link in the spiritual life of a nation and if there is no 
possibility to acknowledge it freely, this fact brings about the spiritual estrangement and 
secession of that fraction of the nation".13 He also referred to the fact that education was 
not in Croatian but in the „Muraközi" language and, while Marosy could maintain relations 
with Hungarians in Croatia, Gaj, the Croatian ambassador in Budapest did not have any 
possibility for that.14 The Croatian government prohibited the activity of the nazis in 
Osijek after a long period of wrangling and permitted the operation of the Hungarian 
Cultural Community. According to the Croatian Ministry of Education 12 Hungarian 
sections were set up in Croatian primary schools in the academic year of 1942—43.15 
Croatia profited from this favourable result and suggested a Hungarian—Croatian cultural 
agreement following the example of the Croatian—Rumanian agreement already existing. 
The Hungarian government, however, definitely evaded this proposal. The only thing that 
happened in this context was the fact that the Hungarian ambassador, Arnold Van der 
Venne suggested the revision of textbooks from the point of view of ethnic policy in the 
autumn of 1944. Although the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received this suggestion 
„with great benevolence", they thought that „its realization in practice is not possible in our 
critical times".16 
After the failure of the plan of population — exchange the Hungarian government 
came up with a new idea; they initiated the repatriation of scattered Hungarian people in 
" OL K - 6 3 Küm. pol. 1 9 4 2 - 6 7 - 3 1 . , 3 2 . 
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13 OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1 9 4 2 - 6 7 - 1 0 5 . 
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Bosnia „exposed to peril" by the Croatian government. Marosy and Lorkovic signed the 
agreement on this in April 1942. According to this the Croatian government assumes to buy 
the possessions of the transmigrating people who could take their countervalue with them. 
In response, the Hungarian government modified its earlier order on the basis of which 
Croatian people exiled from Hungary or leaving the country voluntarily could not take even 
their personal property with them. The agreement included the resettlement of the 
population of four Bosnian villages stricken by civil war: Gunja, VuCinjak, Bröko and 
Bjelina.17 
Ambassador Marosy tried to provide solemnity for the relocation, following the example 
of the colonization of Székely people in Bácska, but his intention was disconcerted by the 
Croatian civil war and the German „cleansing" actions directed against partisans. The 
German—Hungarian agreement, according to which Hungarians „had to demonstrate their 
national status with small Hungarian flags" during the German cleansing activities, can be 
called tragi-comic. As a matter of fact, there were many occasions when even Hungarian 
people planning to move out became the victims of German military actions. During the 
relocation which finished in September 1942, altogether 395 families, 15,552 persons were 
removed into former Dobovoljac villages of Bácska, among the Székely people who had 
settled there before from Bukovina. People from Gunja were settled in Hadikliget 
(Veternik), people from Bröko were relocated in Hadiknépe (Sirig), while for the new home 
of the population of Bjelina they nominated Hadiknépe and Horthyvára (Stepanicevo).18 
The Kállay-government brought up the idea of the exchange of population again 
in February 1944 and they imagined to make only a „momentary exception" to it, with 
respect to the situation in Croatia, that is, the war. The Croatian government had already 
given up its negative attitude by that time and only insisted on the claim that Croatian 
emigration to Hungary had to be bound to a term of several years. The Croatian 
government undoubtedly wanted to create a favourable atmosphere for the re-examination 
of the question of Muraköz with this attitude and the Hungarian government brought up the 
question again — in the given situation — not in hope of a quick solution, either, but in the 
hope (which was already rather vain) that they could strengthen their territorial position in 
the Southern parts referring to the legal apparatus of the agreement in case of a post-war 
rearrangement. These negotiations, however, became negotiations on refugees soon because 
of the changing of the military situation, and the Hungarian government had to apply the 
formula of „momentary exception". During the negotiations which finished in May the 
main object of debate between ambassador Marosy and his partner, Gaj, leader of the 
Political Department of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the question of 
treating refugees as emigrants who leave the country for ever (this was Gaj's idea) or allow 
17 OL K—28 ME Kisebbségi o. (Dept. of Minorities) 1942—R—24333. 
18 A. SAJTI ENIKŐ: Délvidék 1941—1944. A magyar kormányok délszláv nemzetiségpolitikája (ENIKŐ A. SAJTI: 
The South 1941—1944. The Southern Slav Ethnic policy of Hungarian Governments) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 1987. p. 102. More detailed information about the settlement of Székelys in Bácska: ib. pp. 53—73 and 
A. SAJTI ENIKŐ: Székely telepítés és nemzetiség-politika a Bácskában — 1941. (ENIKŐ A. SAJTI: Settlement an<l 
Ethnic policy of Székelys in Bácska —1941) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984. 
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them, for a definite period of time, to return to their original home. It turned out during 
the negotiations that — in opposition to the principle accepted already — Croatia wanted 
to treat refugees as emigrants leaving the country permanently and asserted a right to their 
property. Marosy succeeded in achieving Gaj's approval of determining a definite period 
for returning and regarding refugees as real emigrants only after this period of time. 
Further problems emerged owing to the fact that Gaj was dismissed as a result of the usual 
and frequent replacements of staff in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His 
successor, Rieger was completely uninformed about the matter and came up with a new 
proposal. Marosy and Rieger signed the Hungarian—Croatian agreement on the matter of 
refugees finally, on 4 May. According to the agreement the matters of the emigrants would 
have been treated by a mixed committee and Croatian emigrants could have returned to 
their original home within two years, while those who intended to remain could assume 
Hungarian citizenship. They could have taken their property with them, too. The order 
prohibited the admission of Jewish and Greek Orthodox people and only those Hungarians 
would have been admitted who had joined the Hungarian Cultural Community. The 
agreement, however — owing to the development of the military situation — could not have 
been realized in practice.19 
After the German occupation of Hungary Croatia thought that the time for making 
reminder steps in the matter of Muraköz in Berlin had arrived. When Marosy blamed 
Djordje Peric, Croatian Secretary of Foreign Affairs for this, „he declared, without any 
embarrassment, that he had considered opportune to remind Berlin of the fact that Muraköz 
belonged to Croatia according to the Croatian point of view". Then he criticized the policy 
of foreign affairs of his predecessor Lorkovic, who — in his opinion — had renounced the 
triangle of Baranya from the very beginning and thus, as Lorkovic mentioned, the Croatian 
government did not hold „trump card" to be played in the question of Muraköz. At the 
same time he tried to calm Marosy by saying that his step made in Berlin did not mean 
open discussion on the problem of the region at all.20 Of course, it did not depend on the 
Croatian government but rather on the fact that Germany repressed the Croatian attempt 
counting on possible Hungarian—German conflicts again. It is important to note that 
Germany was not in the position to redraw the map of Europe already. 
The concluding moment of Hungarian—Croatian relations was the idea of co-
operation in military actions against partisans which was brought up by Glaise von 
Horstenau, German general in Zagreb. According to the plan both armies could cross the 
border in a 30- km-distance during the battles. The Sztójay-government negotiated the 
question of the Germans at the cabinet-meeting of 17 August 1944. The Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs detailed the plan that Germany should call upon the Croatian government 
to turn directly to the government of Hungary with this claim. However, the Hungarian 
government could play a part that would have served the defence of the borders of the 
" OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1944—67—13., 18., 36., and OL K—74 I. Bejövő számjeltávirat (Incoming code — 
telegram) Zagreb. 5 May 1944. 
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country even in this case and „could not assume to take part in actions like this reaching 
as far as the coast of Dalmatia". The Minister of Defence detailed his conception that the 
line determined by the government could not reach more than 10 km from the border. 
According to Minister of Finance Reményi—Schneller the government could argue well 
towards Germany with saying that they wanted to avoid evoking the impression in Croatian 
public opinion that Hungary intended to rearrange the empire of Stephen I by crossing the 
borders. The Cabinet finally accepted the following decision: Hungary is ready to supply 
troops against Croatian „gangs" only upon the appplication of the Croatian government and 
enters into battle in a 10 km — distance from the Hungarian—Croatian border. Hungarian 
military forces would enter deeper only in case of „the conclusion of a new agreement on 
this matter between the governments of Hungary and Croatia interested in this situation".21 
Pavelic was not enthusiastic about the German general's idea, either. He was afraid 
of the possibility that Hungary would interpret the principle of crossing the border in a 
special way and utilize it to satisfy its territorial claims. He might have remembered the 
earlier German plan made before the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, which counted with 
Croatian autonomy achieved with the help of the Croatian Peasants' Party under the aegis 
of Hungary. This would have meant practically, as he detailed it to Ciano, Italian Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs that he would not preserve his power even for twenty-four hours.22 
If we evaluate the question of Muraköz exerting basic influence on Hun-
garian—Croatian relations within the whole of the Southern policy of the Hungarian 
governments, we can conclude that this policy was characterized by a special kind of 
dualism in the beginning, especially at the time of the government of Bárdossy. Strong-arm 
policy, internments, mass expulsions and punitive razzias against Serbs in Bácska23, and 
the „distinguished", friendly treatment of Croatians in Muraköz. These, of course, were 
motivated by clear and explainable reasons: by the existing and exaggerated „Yugoslavism" 
of the Serbs in Bácska, the over-estimation of the actual strength of partisan-movements in 
this region and — owing to the lack of Serbian statehood, there was no risk of potential 
revenge, and there was not any significant Hungarian minority in the territory of the 
remaining Serbia. It was not the impatient trend of Hungarian nationalism, represented 
mainly by military circles at this time, that became dominant in the Croatian ethnic question 
like in Bácska but its tolerant traditions. The existence of the mother-country belonging to 
the federalist system of Germany, evoking the impression of autonomy, played an 
undoubtedly important role in this. That is why — beside the significant difference in the 
number of Hungarian and Croatian nationalities living in the territory of the two countries 
—, the policy of reciprocity proved to be a feasible way in spite of the difficulties 
mentioned above. The solution of the debates concerning the regional questions of 
Muraköz, as I mentioned earlier, depended mainly on the attitude of Germany and not on 
the two governments, in spite of appearances. 
21 OL K—27 Minutes of the Cabinet's session of 17 August 1944. 
22 OL K—74 I. Incoming code-telegram. Zagreb, 9 September 1944., Tajni archivi grofa Ciana (1936—1942) 
Beograd, 1962.501. 
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The problem of Muraköz was not arranged as a regional matter, in accordance 
with German interests after the war, but according to the global European interests of the 
winners. Because of the anti-German struggles of partisans the problem of Muraköz was 
not brought up as a self-contained Croatian or Hungarian question at the peace-negotiations 
but as the territorial claim of Yugoslavia struggling by the side of the Allied Forces. 
The idea of the independent Croatian statehood went a similar way, too. The image 
of the Independent Croatian State was filled excusively with negative contents during the 
short period of its establishment and existence in contemporary international opinion and 
not without reason. The new and radical change of international forces, the end of the cold 
war and the collapse of the two-pole world were necessary for the old and new Great 
Powers to forget it and for the Croatian efforts for independence to get historical follow-
wind instead of the headwind under completely new external—internal conditions and not 
independently from the internal and structural problems of Yugoslavia. 
A. Sajti Enikő 
Magyar—horvát államközi kapcsolatok (1941—1944) 
A szerző az európai nemzetközi erőtér változásával, valamint a magyar kormányok 
délvidéki politikájával összefüggésben tárgyalja az első, modern kori magyar—horvát 
államközi kapcsolatok létrejöttét és alakulását. Abból indul ki, hogy a hosszú idő óta 
történelmi ellenszélben vitorlázó horvát függetlenségi törekvések a háború idején a náci 
Németországtól kaptak politikai, katonai támogatást. Ez azt jelentette, hogy a horvát 
nemzeti mozgalmon belül eddig marginális helyre szorult extrém nacionalizmus, az usztasák 
jutottak rövid történelmi szerephez. E kronológiai és minőségi értelemben is korlátok közé 
szorított kapcsolatok centrális kérdése a Muraköz hovatartozásának kérdése, valamint ennek 
prizmáján keresztül a két ország területén élő kisebbségek problémája volt. 
A tanulmány részletesen kitér a Jugoszlávia felosztását rögzítő bécsi német—olasz 
megállapodás alapján folytatott magyar—horvát határtárgyalásokra, ezek kudarcának okaira, 
a német kormány ezzel kapcsolatos magatartására. A német „semlegesség" lehetővé tette, 
hogy Magyarország 1941. július 1-én egyoldalú lépéssel az ország részévé nyilvánította a 
Muraközt, s bevezette a katonai közigazgatást. A tárgyalások kudarca miatt érezhetően 
megromlottak a magyar—horvát kapcsolatok. Gyakoriakká váltak a határincidensek, s 
negatív változás következett be a két ország kisebbségpolitikájában is. Magyarországon, a 
Bácskához hasonlóan, megkezdődött a délszláv telepesek és az ún. bevándoroltak 
kiutasítása. Horvátországban pedig hivatalos sugallatra aktivizálódott az ottani magyar 
nyilasok tevékenysége. A tanulmány további részében a szerző kitér a két kormány 
lakosságcserére vonatkozó álláspontjára, az ennek kapcsán folytatott tárgyalásokra. 
Megállapítja: mivel az usztasa Horvátország soha nem mondott le a Muraközről, 
ragaszkodott a terület „népi állagának" megőrzéséhez, így e tárgyalások egészen a háború 
végéig nem mozdultak ki a holtpontról, amikor is menekültügyi tárgyalásokká váltak. De 
a reciprocitásra építő magyar álláspont sem volt alkalmas a megegyezésre, mivel 
szándékosan nem vette figyelembe a két ország területén élő horvát, illetve magyar 
kisebbség eltérő létszámából fakadó különbségeket. Magyar kezdeményezésre egyedül a 
boszniai magyarok hazatelepítését sikerült elérni. 
Az 1941—1944 közötti magyar— horvát kapcsolatok záróakkordját a németek által 
felvetett közös magyar—horvát partizánellenes katonai együttműködés gondolata képezte. 
Tanulmánya végén megállapítja: a Muraköz hovatartozása a háború után a győztesek 
globális érdekeinek rendelődött alá, nem önálló horvát vagy magyar kérdésként vetődött fel, 
hanem a szövetségesek oldalán harcoló Jugoszlávia területi igényeként. Hasonló megítélés 
alá esett a Független Horvát állam rövid fennállása alatt negatív tartalommal telítődő 
független horvát állam gondolata is. A nemzetközi erőtér újabb, gyökeres átalakulásának 
kellett ahhoz bekövetkeznie, hogy nem függetlenül Jugoszlávia belső, strukturális 
válságától, egy regionális háború következményei között, történelmi ellenszél helyett ismét 
történelmi hátszelet kapjanak a horvát függetlenségi törekvések, felvetve egyúttal a 
magyar—horvát államközi kapcsolatok újraépítésének szükségességét. 
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